
"But since ’82, 26 years ago, Israel has not won any war. They did not defeat the Palestinian resistance, and they did not defeat the Lebanese resistance. Since that time, Israel has not expanded but has contracted. They have withdrawn from southern Lebanon and from Gaza. These are indicators that the future is not favorable to Israel. Then today Israel, with all its military capabilities – conventional and unconventional – are not enough to guarantee Israel’s security. Today, with all these capabilities, they can’t stop a simple rocket from being launched from Gaza."
Oddly enough, from the opposite end of the spectrum, that crazed zionist wingnut Daniel Pipes suggested back in 2004 that Israel was in decline:
"In its early decades, Israel's strategic prowess was legendary, transforming a weak country into a regional powerhouse. The past decade has seen the opposite process, whereby that powerhouse reduces itself to a tempting target. "
You gotta hand it to Pipes, he was pointing out Israel's decline a couple of years before the 2006 Lebanon fiasco. And Israel's present attempt to eliminate that embarrassment hasn't changed Pipes' mind. In a January 11 editorial in the Jerusalem Post he attacks the present Gaza offensive and comes to the devastating conclusion that "no one at the upper echelons of Israel's political life articulates the imperative for victory. For this reason, I see Israel as a lost polity, one full of talent, energy, and resolve but lacking direction."
Pretty strong words.
Pipes also points to an interesting paper by Anthony Cordesman for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, entitled "Tactical Gains, Strategic Defeat?" Cordesman, Senator John McCain's former national security assistant and the former director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is a thoroughly mainstream, relatively high level analyst in the US state machine with a long resume. His arguments are equally stark and worth quoting at length:
"This raises a question that every Israeli and its supporters now needs to ask. What is the strategic purpose behind the present fighting? After two weeks of combat Olmert, Livni, and Barak have still not said a word that indicates that Israel will gain strategic or grand strategic benefits, or tactical benefits much larger than the gains it made from selectively striking key Hamas facilities early in the war. In fact, their silence raises haunting questions about whether they will repeat the same massive failures made by Israel’s top political leadership during the Israeli-Hezbollah War in 2006. Has Israel somehow blundered into a steadily escalating war without a clear strategic goal or at least one it can credibly achieve? Will Israel end in empowering an enemy in political terms that it defeated in tactical terms? Will Israel’s actions seriously damage the US position in the region, any hope of peace, as well as moderate Arab regimes and voices in the process?
"To blunt, the answer so far seems to be yes. To paraphrase a comment about the British government’s management of the British Army in World War I, lions seem to be led by donkeys. If Israel has a credible ceasefire plan that could really secure Gaza, it is not apparent. If Israel has a plan that could credibly destroy and replace Hamas, it is not apparent. If Israel has any plan to help the Gazans and move them back towards peace, it is not apparent. If Israel has any plan to use US or other friendly influence productively, it not apparent."
The fact that there is a growing sense of unease and dismay amongst Israel's strongest supporters, even as Zionism's opponents detect important weaknesses should hearten those of us who want to see a just peace in the Middle East. It will only be through a series of defeats for Israel, on multiple levels and not just the military, that such a peace is possible.
3 comments :
I doubt that Israel is in decline given that much of the territory it holds is occupied land. A rationalized Israel would be defined by its 1967 borders and not one hectare more.
What is apparent, however, is that Israel is muscle bound, still reflexively reaching for the heavy guns even in situations that require other solutions.
Israel hasn't played its cards very well - from anyone's perspective and its "we'll bomb you into submission" attitude is just plain old.
I think we're seeing a rebirth of the "paper tiger" geopolitics that served America so poorly in Vietnam and, 30-years later, in Iraq.
The general shift in Western public opinion away from supporting Israel and towards either sympathy with (liberal mushiness) or actual solidarity with Palestine is another piece of the puzzle. I think this has everything to do with the continuing but largely unnoticed/unacknowledged reverberations from the 2002/3 anti-war movement.
This wave of global protest, which was reinforced with Israel's 2006 invasion of Lebanon, has substantially undermined the large swathe of soft support for Israel - the millions of Westerners suckered in by arguments that brought up the Holocaust or Israel's supposed democracy.
The actions innoculated millions against pro-war propaganda by spreading a healthy pessimism in regards to the media. Part of Israel's inability to win the PR campaign is not their PR itself but a broader distrust of the mainstream media which lost enormous amounts of credibility over Iraq and has failed to recover - to the extent that papers like the Globe & Mail are compelled to promote a liberal critique of the war in Afghanistan, something they would not have done otherwise (my opinion).
Islamophobia remains the chief card the pro-Israel media, Western governments and Israeli PR machine can play.
Students - I think you're right about the role of the anti-war movement in undercutting support for Israel and uncritical acceptance of the mainstream media. And it's also true what you say about Islamophobia being a key prop.
Mound of Sound - Israel still retains the Occupied Territories, true. But they were forced to retreat from Lebanon in 2001 and were defeated there again in 2006. They also withdrew from Gaza, fearing the effects on Israel of staying there - the demographic question being one part of this but also the costs of an endless guerilla conflict. This relative retrenchment is not insignificant. But, also, as Meshal points out in the fuller quote, Israel went from defeating three Arab national armies in 1967, in three days, to being unable to beat a small guerilla army in Lebanon - and now, to having to fight for almost three weeks against an impoverished, barely armed militia in Gaza.
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